One of the least discussed but most consequential obstacles to ending the Iran war is the fear among Iranian diplomats and officials that participating in negotiations with the United States may cost them their lives. The assassination of key Iranian figures during and around previous diplomatic windows has created a chilling effect on Tehran’s willingness to send credible representatives to any peace table — a problem that Washington’s own actions have directly caused.
Iran’s foreign ministry spokesperson articulated this concern plainly when he described Iran’s “very catastrophic experience with US diplomacy.” The reference was to two specific incidents: the US attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities during the 12-day war last summer — which occurred while negotiations were ongoing — and the launch of the current conflict during a period when progress toward a comprehensive agreement was reportedly being made. From Tehran’s perspective, diplomacy with Washington has repeatedly been used as a cover for military action.
Israel has compounded this problem by specifically targeting Iran’s senior leadership. The killing of Ali Larijani and other officials has removed the pragmatic tier of Iranian decision-making and sent an unmistakable message to any Iranian official who might contemplate serious engagement: visibility in negotiations makes you a target. Trump’s own remarks — that Iranian leaders fear being “killed by us” if they agree to a deal — confirm rather than deny this dynamic.
Iran’s five-point counter-proposal includes a specific demand for an end to the assassination of its officials. This condition, which the US has not publicly addressed, is effectively a precondition for meaningful diplomatic engagement. Without it, any negotiations would be conducted under an implicit death sentence for the Iranian participants — a condition that no government could realistically accept.
Resolving this trust deficit is perhaps the most underappreciated challenge of the current peace effort. Technical disputes over nuclear programmes and waterway access can be negotiated; deeply held fears about personal safety and regime survival are much harder to address. For the intermediaries from Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey working to bring the parties together, finding a way to give Iranian negotiators credible security guarantees may be the prerequisite for everything else.